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INIGO MONTOYA GOES TO WAR
GARY LAWSON∗

INTRODUCTION
In The Princess Bride,1 the conniving Sicilian Vizzini is constantly
declaring that events that are obviously occurring in plain sight are
“inconceivable.”2 The third time (in the span of five pages) that Vizzini
proclaims something that is clearly happening to be “inconceivable,” Vizzini’s
then-companion, the Spaniard Inigo Montoya, snaps, “You keep using that
word! . . . I don’t think it means what you think it does.”3
The voice of Inigo Montoya (well, actually the voice of Mandy Patinkin,
who brilliantly deadpanned rather than “snapped”4 a version of the line in the
movie adaptation of The Princess Bride5) was running through my head while
I was reading the two books that are paired for this symposium at Boston
University School of Law: Mariah Zeisberg’s War Powers: The Politics of
Constitutional Authority6 and Stephen Griffin’s Long Wars and the
Constitution.7 Each author’s analysis centers on single, repeatedly used words
that I do not think mean what the authors think they mean. In the case of
Professor Zeisberg, the word is “constitutional”; in the case of Professor
Griffin, the word is “war.” Interestingly, Professor Zeisberg pays keen
attention to the ambiguities latent in the word “war,” (Zeisberg pp. 5, 8, 12-13,
19, 21) while Professor Griffin neatly avoids most of the problems raised by
Professor Zeisberg’s use of the term “constitutional” by treating his conception
of a “constitutional order” (Griffin pp. 4, 14) as descriptive rather than
prescriptive. If one could somehow merge the two books, perhaps Inigo’s
voice would be silenced. But as things stand, both books, while immensely
valuable resources, are in need of significant clarification.
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WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE (1973).
2 Id. at 88, 89, 92, 94.
3 Id. at 92.
4 Id.
5 THE PRINCESS BRIDE (20th Century Fox 1987).
6 MARIAH ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
(2013).
7 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION (2013).
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I
Professor Zeisberg’s starting point is a Constitution without clear answers—
or at least without clear answers to some very important questions about the
employment of military force by the United States. According to Professor
Zeisberg, “the US Constitution’s allocation of the power to initiate hostilities is
ambiguous.” (Zeisberg p. 5). By this she means at least three things: (1) the
text of the Constitution employs key terms, such as “declare War”8 and
“executive Power,”9 whose meanings, both alone and in combination, are not
clear and thus give rise to competing accounts of which institutions of the
national government can control the exercise of military power in particular
circumstances; (2) this textual uncertainty cannot be dispelled by conventional
legal tools of interpretation (p.12); and (3) the Constitution does not prescribe
an authoritative mode of settlement to resolve differences when executive and
legislative actors advance competing and inconsistent accounts of their powers.
(pp. 6-8). Thus, she concludes:
Both the Constitution’s text—which apparently commits the elaboration
of the meaning of “war” to a potentially rivalrous interbranch
relationship—and the history of war powers debates, where the branches’
interpretive claims are transparently driven by partisan, institutional, and
policy rivalries, generate one common conclusion: core features of this
area of constitutional policy do not intersect well with standard
presumptions about the conditions of faithful constitutional interpretation.
(p. 8).
Let us assume for the moment (because it is true) that Professor Zeisberg is
right that figuring out, for example, whether, when, and how the Constitution
empowers the President to commit American troops to combat without
congressional approval is not an easy task. At a minimum, any topic that can
generate a three-way split, just within the relatively small family of originalist
scholars, among Sai Prakash, Mike Ramsey, and Robert Delahunty and John
Yoo about something as basic as whether the President can unilaterally
respond to another country’s declaration of war against the United States10 is
not likely to be a topic that is prone to generate obvious answers. Let us further
grant (because it is true) that each department of the national government must
interpret the Constitution in the course of carrying out its functions. And let us
8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
10 Compare Saikrishna Prakash, Unleashing the Dogs of War: What the Constitution
Means by “Declare War,” 93 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that only Congress can
respond to a declaration of war), with Michael D. Ramsey, The President’s Power to
Respond to Attacks, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 169 (2007) (arguing that the President can
respond, both defensively and offensively, once another nation initiates war against the
United States), and Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Making War, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 123
(2007) (arguing that the President has an independent power to initiate hostilities even in the
absence of a foreign declaration of war).
9
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further grant (because it is true) that the Constitution does not designate any
one department the supreme interpreter of the Constitution.11 How, within this
framework, would one evaluate the constitutional claims of any given
governmental actor?
Professor Zeisberg delineates criteria to assess the interpretative
performance of the legislative and executive departments. Because those
criteria involve to some extent the ways in which each department engages the
other, (pp. 38-39) she terms the theory employing these criteria “relational.”12
The criteria themselves largely concern the ways in which each institution
brings its own distinctive characteristics and expertise to bear on problems, so
Professor Zeisberg terms them “processual” (or “processualist”) standards. (p.
19). For example, the President “is able to command the resources of
intelligence, diplomatic, and military establishments” and has distinctive
capacities for “[r]ewarding and elevating subordinates who demonstrate
excellence,” “experimenting with policy,” and “responding quickly to changing
circumstances.” (p. 35). Congress, for its part, can facilitate “divergent paths of
reasoning,” “harness the power of consensus politics” in the course of
“lawmaking,” and “pool and weigh information from multiple sources.” (p.
37). Actors within each department must “link their arguments about
constitutional authority to their substantive agendas for security policy.” (p.
33). The bulk of Professor Zeisberg’s book applies these criteria to legislative
and executive assertions of power in a wide range of historical settings to see
whether and how various actors brought these capacities to bear on real-world
problems.
I am no political scientist, so I would not even venture to speculate whether
these criteria provide an apt metric for evaluating the foreign policy
performance of governmental actors. They certainly seem plausible to me—but
I also found the Sisler metric for rating pitchers plausible,13 so what do I know.
Professor Zeisberg, however, means for these criteria to measure the
constitutional rather than foreign-policy performance of government officials.
That is where I think we encounter some problems with words. I have a hard
time seeing what is gained by calling this a “constitutional” mode of
assessment.
I would have thought that the way to evaluate someone’s constitutional
interpretation was by reference to a theory of constitutional interpretation. A

11

On both of the latter propositions, see Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The
Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996).
12 Id. at 41 (“The centrality of well-conducted interbranch responsiveness leads me to
name this a relational conception of war authority.”).
13 This quadratic-like formula—((2IP-H) + (SO- 4/3BB) – 0.25ER)/IP—was designed to
supplant earned-run average as the measure of pitching effectiveness. It died such a quick
and grisly death that it does not appear even to merit a Wikipedia entry. But I always
thought that it made a lot of sense, especially since the earned-run average of a starting
pitcher depends so heavily on the quality of the bullpen.
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good interpreter employs a good interpretative theory in an honest,
conscientious, and intelligent fashion to reach the result that is correct in a
given context of knowledge. If one thinks, as I do, that a certain species of
originalism is the uniquely correct way to interpret the Constitution,14 then it
follows that interpretations are good or bad depending on how well they
employ that methodology.15 If one benightedly holds to a different theory of
interpretation, one would still expect that theory to guide the judgment about
how to evaluate interpretations. In any case, it is no great mystery from the
standpoint of interpretative theory “[o]n what basis . . . Congress, or the
presidency, [should] develop its constitutional understandings.” (pp. 22-23).
They should develop constitutional understandings based on sound
applications of sound interpretative theory, just like everybody else. Good
interpretations are good interpretations regardless of who makes them. What is
sauce for the judge, or the scholar, or the citizen, or the nuclear physicist who
happens to be interested in interpretation, is sauce for the President or
Congress. The Constitution’s meaning does not change depending on the
official title of the person who is reading it at the time.
Professor Zeisberg would have it otherwise. She thinks that because
interpretative theory cannot provide clear answers—what she terms
“settlement” (p. 8)—some other criteria for evaluating interpretations must be
found. As she forthrightly puts it: “Instead of evaluating whether the branches
adhere to determinate textual meaning, we can evaluate them in terms of how
well they bring their special institutional capacities to bear on the problem of
interpreting the Constitution’s substantive standards about war.” (pp. 18-19). I
am happy to grant that this might be a perfectly sensible way of “assessing the
branches’ war powers politics.” (p. 31). But I simply don’t get why one would
call this a constitutional assessment.
Professor Zeisberg’s answer—that the standards that emerge from her
analysis of the capacities of the various governmental actors “are distinctively
constitutional to the extent that the capacities themselves are constitutional
ones” (p. 31)—is a non sequitur. All capacities of the President and Congress
are “constitutional ones,” in the sense that the President and Congress are
created by the Constitution and can only act in the ways empowered by it. That
includes the capacity to engage in pork-barrel politics, to exercise dubious
discretion in enforcement, and to appoint political hacks to supervise responses
to medical pandemics. Professor Zeisberg’s criteria strike me as far better
capacities for judging foreign policy than these others, but that is not because

14 See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23
CONST. COMMENT. 47 (2006).
15 Note that a good constitutional interpretation will not necessarily reflect good foreign
policy. The criteria for evaluating foreign policy decisions are unlikely to have much to do
with the sorts of things that make for good interpretations of texts, unless one somehow
believes that the Constitution uniformly prescribes normatively sound answers to
contemporary foreign policy issues, which seems more than a bit unlikely.
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her criteria are somehow “more” constitutional. They are all equally
constitutional. Constitutionality is not a matter of degree; it either exists or it
does not.16 Professor Zeisberg’s criteria are surely more appropriate as a
matter of common-sense normative judgment than are some other
constitutionally derived criteria that one can imagine, but that does not make
their application a “constitutional” determination.
Consider in this regard perhaps the most complete description of Professor
Zeisberg’s approach:
What is the methodology of this book? The relational conception starts by
identifying the relevant substantive terms at stake in the Constitution’s
allocation of power; then identifies the institutional process(es) harnessed
to give content to that substantive vocabulary; theorizes the terms on
which these different processes are related to one another, if there is more
than one (i.e., the terms of interbranch relationship); develops standards
related to those institutional processes; and then assesses moments of
constitutional politics in terms of those relevant substantive and
processual standards. This method enables a normative analysis of
constitutional politics in light of constitutional ideals. (p. 223).
Everything is fine until the last two words. We still lack something that
translates a metric for evaluating policy into a metric for evaluating
interpretations of a text. Invoking constitutional ideals rather than
constitutional texts does not do the trick. The Constitution does not contain
ideals. It contains provisions. The document’s drafters and ratifiers (real or
hypothetical) no doubt hoped and/or expected those provisions to promote
certain ideals, but constitutionality consists of adherence to the provisions of
the Constitution, not to the hopes or expectations that may have spawned
them.17 It is of course possible for a provision textually to incorporate a hope
or ideal or goal; just imagine a provision that reads: “Congress shall have
power to take whatever action may be necessary to promote national security.”
It just so happens, contingently but factually, that the provisions of the
16 This is a statement about metaphysics, not epistemology. It does not mean that there is
a known, determinate answer to every question at each point in time. It simply means that
constitutionality is a binary quantity, though which of the two quantities is correct may not
always be known.
17 For more on this, in the specific context of the Sotirios-Barber-like emphasis on the
Preamble that Professor Zeisberg seems at times to adopt, see ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at
241, and Gary Lawson, Understanding State Constitutions: Locke and Key, 93 TEX. L. REV.
SEE ALSO 203, 207-09 (2015). For now, it is enough to note that the Preamble, while
expressing certain ideals, is not a grant of power to any governmental actor. The
mechanisms for achieving—or not achieving—those Preambular ideals are the powergranting clauses (and the clauses that limit the exercises of those powers). It is quite possible
that the Constitution is a colossal botch job that will utterly fail to achieve the hoped-for
ends and ideals. The extent to which the power-granting (and power-limiting) provisions
actually serve the hoped-for ends, and thus fulfill the expectations of the Preamble, is an
empirical question.
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Constitution relevant to the war powers debate do not take this form; there is
no abstract “power to promote national security” clause,18 but simply a series
of clauses that the drafters/ratifiers hoped or expected, rightly or wrongly,
would promote national security if implemented. At the very least, if Professor
Zeisberg believes that the relevant provisions take such a form, there needs to
be an argument to that effect.
Professor Zeisberg, perhaps anticipating this analysis, observes that her
methodology “varies dramatically from traditional legal modalities of
constitutional assessment.” (p. 223). There is nothing at all wrong, and in many
contexts perhaps a great deal right, with varying dramatically from traditional
legal modalities. But then why call the resulting analysis “constitutional”?
Does anything at all change if the adjective “constitutional” is expunged from
the passage? Why not just call it a normative assessment, declare victory, and
be done with it?
There is a ubiquitous drive on both sides of all relevant legal spectrums to
“constitutionalize” almost everything, as though one would not have enough
traction for an argument without the word “constitutional” somehow being a
part of it. But not everything has a constitutional answer. How well Congress
and the President perform their tasks is not necessarily a distinctively
constitutional question. The Constitution creates certain institutions and gives
them certain powers, subject to certain constraints. That is all that it does. To
be sure, that is a great deal, but it is less than everything in the universe. One
simply does not violate the Constitution by behaving sub-optimally unless
there is some constitutional provision that dictates that functions be performed
with a certain degree of optimality.
As it happens, the Constitution does actually contain some norms of
competence along the lines proposed by Professor Zeisberg. To the extent that
the Constitution is a fiduciary instrument, it imposes a duty of care, as well as
various other fiduciary duties, that can be used to assess the performance of
governmental actors in a genuinely—meaning textually grounded—
constitutional sense.19 It is quite possible that some, and perhaps even most, of
Professor Zeisberg’s relational and processual criteria can be derived from
these fiduciary norms. It is not at all, as Vizzini might say, inconceivable that
Professor Zeisberg is absolutely right about absolutely everything that she says
about appropriate constitutional standards for judging the performance of
executive and legislative actors. But those norms would have to be derived
18

The Taxing Clause contains the words “provide for the common Defence,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, but those words merely describe one of the permissible uses of the
taxing power; they do not independently grant any power to Congress.
19 For a brief introduction to this concept, see Gary Lawson, Guy Seidman & Robert G.
Natelson, The Fiduciary Foundations of Federal Equal Protection, 94 B.U. L. REV. 415
(2014). Guy Seidman and I are currently writing a book that will expand upon and apply the
concept to a wide range of settings, including the war power. See (even though you can’t
because it does not yet exist) GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, “A GREAT POWER OF
ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2017 or so).
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from a process of interpretation—that is, from the application of a sound
interpretative theory to the relevant textual provisions. If those norms do not
emerge from such a process, there is no epistemological warrant for calling
them constitutional norms—even if they happen, by chance, metaphysically to
correspond to genuine constitutional norms.
Similarly, the Constitution contains some actual provisions that specifically
call for some of the “relational” inter-branch engagement favored by Professor
Zeisberg (and by Professor Griffin as well). The President must “from time to
time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union,”20 and he must
also “recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient.”21 The President must get “the Advice and Consent
of the Senate”22 when making treaties or appointing certain officers. If the
President chooses to veto a bill, “he shall return it, with his Objections to that
House in which it shall have originated.”23 These are all provisions that
demand interdepartmental engagement of some sort. But there is no
generalized “consult with the other departments” clause beyond these specific
provisions. Again, it may be good prudence to draw on the expertise of others,
including other governmental institutions; and if the Constitution is a fiduciary
instrument, there may even be a constitutional foundation for some version of
that prudential requirement. But there is nothing constitutionally obligatory
about interdepartmental consultation unless it derives from such a textually
grounded fiduciary principle or a particularized provision.
In sum, I suspect that one could delete the word “constitutional” entirely
from Professor Zeisberg’s book and not lose much by the excision. Virtually
all of her insights—and they are many, and go unnoted here only because I am
focusing on a very narrow point—can be made without invoking the specter of
the Constitution.
Four brief thoughts before moving on: First, nothing that I have said here
endorses settlement as a constitutional imperative, or even as a constitutional
good. The Constitution does not contain a “settlement” clause. If one chooses
to endorse settlement as a normative matter—and I am very, very far from a
fan of settlement as a normative matter24—one must import that normative
preference from outside the Constitution.
Second, Professor Zeisberg posits “we should be skeptical of accounts of
constitutional fidelity that begin with the premise that the ordinary behavior of
elected officials is constitutionally deficient.”25 At least some, and perhaps
20

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
Id.
22 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
23 Id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
24 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Interpretative Equality as a Structural Imperative (Or
“Pucker Up and Settle This!”), 20 CONST. COMMENT. 379 (2003).
25 ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at 9. I assume that Professor Zeisberg urges skepticism
towards approaches that yield conclusions that much of historical and contemporary practice
21
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many, originalist approaches definitely yield such a conclusion—about war
powers as well as other matters. But why should one be skeptical in this
fashion, any more than one should start with the premise that everything is
unconstitutional? The extent to which the behavior of officials is consistent
with the Constitution is decidedly an empirical question, and I am at a loss to
see why one would start with a presumption either way. The facts are what
they are.26
Third, and somewhat off point in this essay (and I even mention it only
because it is a pet peeve), Professor Zeisberg notes that the aim of her
approach “is to show how the relational conception illuminates common
intuitions,” (p. 51) and she emphasizes that “the relational conception can
accommodate common intuitions . . . [and] explain those intuitions . . . .” (p.
51). “Common” among whom? Among elite academics? Rural church-goers in
Wyoming? The attendees at a meeting of the Atlas Society (dedicated to the
study of the thought of Ayn Rand)? I suspect that one will find very different
intuitions “common” depending upon which social circles one inhabits. But
more fundamentally, why would anyone care for a moment what anyone,
including oneself, does or does not intuit? While the idea of rationalizing
intuitions has acquired an intellectual cachet of sorts ever since John Rawls
used it to assure left-liberals that their prejudices are the starting point, and
likely ending point, of moral theory,27 it is a rather peculiar intellectual move
when examined carefully. If the intuitions that are the data points of analysis
happen to be false, then a theory that accommodates them, or even gives them
the time of day, is a giant step backwards. One needs a theory about why
intuitions are epistemologically reliable forms of cognition in the context under
discussion, and that is a tall order.
Fourth, and most importantly, there is something profoundly unfair to
Professor Zeisberg about my entire discussion thus far. Professor Zeisberg was
well aware when she wrote her book that people like me would react precisely
as I am reacting here. One of her main aims is to present an alternative account
of “constitutionalism” that does not focus on interpretative correctness. Surely
Professor Zeisberg is entitled to use the term “constitutional” in any way that

is unconstitutional; no one takes that as a premise.
26 Somewhat relatedly, it is also hard to see why one would worry that traditional
approaches that judge interpretations by how well they interpret “amplify[] conflict between
interpretative positions in larger political and academic debate.” Id. at 247. Does this mean
that interpretative theories are subject to a heckler’s veto that can take them off the table
simply by virtue of the fact of disagreement? Conflict is a good thing if there are falsehoods
to contest, nothing to fear if truth is on one’s side, and potentially a quite useful
epistemological tool if right answers are difficult to determine.
27 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-21, 47-50 (1971). Is this an unfair
characterization of John Rawls and his 500-plus-page model of reflective equilibrium? In a
word: No. For the academic, citation-filled version of “No,” see Gary Lawson, The Ethics of
Insider Trading, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 727, 779 n.214 (1988).
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she pleases, so long as the term is clearly defined. Why should she have to use
the term in my preferred fashion?
Put that way, the answer is, of course, that she is under no obligation, moral
or epistemological, to use words in the fashion that I prescribe. My concern is
this: the most common, and even standard, account of the word
“constitutional” is a lot closer to my usage than to Professor Zeisberg’s (even if
my account of how to fill in the content of that term is better described as
“wildly idiosyncratic” than “standard”). There is accordingly a very high risk
of equivocation when a non-standard definition is introduced. The standard
account, which links constitutionality with the correct application of theories of
constitutional interpretation, gives the term “constitutional” certain
connotations and implications that may not be warranted if the term is instead
used to mean something like “consistency with relational and processual
forms.” For example, some people (I am not one of them, but I encounter them
from time to time) think that calling something “constitutional” entails certain
normative obligations of obedience, or at the very least calls for a certain
measure of respect and consideration. But that implication ordinarily stems
from a conception of “constitutional” that involves derivation of propositions
from textual analysis, not from policy-based applications of institutional
capacities. An argument that substitutes Professor Zeisberg’s conception of
constitutionality for the text-based conception cannot continue to employ the
implications of the text-based conception unless there is an argument, which I
have not yet seen, that shows how those implications flow naturally when one
switches from one meaning to the other.
To be sure, these risks of equivocation can be minimized or avoided through
careful identification of the term’s usage and frequent reminders in the course
of arguments that connotations and implications of the standard account do not
apply to the non-standard usage. I do not see those reminders in Professor
Zeisberg’s work. Indeed, my reading of the book—and I am quite willing to be
told that I have misread it—is that Professor Zeisberg affirmatively believes
that the standard connotations and implications of the term “constitutional”
fully apply to her usage. In that sense, and with that clarification, instead of
saying that I do not think that the word “constitutional” means what she thinks
it means, I should say that I do not think that the word, as she employs it,
connotes and implies what she thinks it connotes and implies.
So how, from within a traditional interpretative framework, would one
assess the constitutional performance of the President or Congress when the
constitutional text is indeterminate? Quite simply: if there is no constitutionally
grounded basis for assessment, then one should not make a constitutional
assessment. If one cannot judge an action by reference to its consistency with
the properly interpreted Constitution, then why try to say anything about it at
all in constitutional terms? It does not suffice to point out that “[t]o refrain
from [constitutionally] evaluating the interpretive politics behind [the
allocation of war authority] . . . is to remove highly consequential domains of
governance from constitutional scrutiny.” (p. 9). Perhaps so. What of it? Why
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does everything consequential have to come within constitutional scrutiny?
After all, one can make all sorts of judgments about actions—political
judgments, moral judgments, and even aesthetic judgments—that do not
involve the rightness or wrongness of their underlying interpretations as a
matter of constitutional interpretation. But without an interpretative grounding
in the meaning of the Constitution, nothing but equivocation is gained by
calling those judgments “constitutional.”
I am not expressing here any view as to which, if any, of the difficult
interpretative problems surrounding the war power have definitive solutions.
The point is only that any “constitutional” assessment of that debate, as with
any “constitutional” assessment of the interpretations advanced by the
President, the Congress, the Supreme Court, or Jack Bauer, must be made with
very careful attention to what it means for something to be “constitutional” and
the connotations and implications that accompany that meaning. I fear that
Professor Zeisberg wants to have her processual Constitution and eat the
interpretative one, too.
II
I have far less to say about Professor Griffin’s Long Wars and the
Constitution, for the simple reason that it is much more about long wars than it
is about the Constitution. As Professor Griffin puts it, his book “is more of an
analytical history of presidential decisionmaking than a legal treatise . . . .”
(Griffin p. 6). It is part history, part political science, part foreign policy, and I
can plausibly claim competence in none of the above. To the extent that legal
issues intertwine with these other analyses, however, Inigo Montoya whispers
in my ear the word “war.”
War is a critical concept for understanding the United States Constitution.
While the word “war” specifically appears only four times—Congress is
granted the power to “declare War,”28 States may not maintain “Ships of War
in time of Peace” or “engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay,”29 and treason against the United
States is defined as “levying War against them”30—the idea of war permeates
the document.31 Powers that do not make specific reference to war often gain
shape from wartime. For example, during war, the President acts as a superlegislator governing occupied territory32 in a fashion that would defy any
28

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
30 Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
31 See Gary Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Common Sense in Times
of Crisis, 87 B.U. L. REV. 289, 290-91 (2007) (discussing the general provisions in the
Constitution that deal with crises the nation might face by allocating authority to Congress,
the states, and the President).
32 See GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 151-52 (2004) (“[T]he power of the United
29
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plausible understanding of “executive Power” during peacetime.33 Searches
that would be obviously “unreasonable”34 during times of peace may be
eminently reasonable during times of war. Statutes that are “necessary and
proper”35 for effectuating federal powers in wartime could fail that test during
peacetime. It makes a very big constitutional difference, across a large range of
powers and limitations, whether the country is or is not at war. As Professor
Griffin puts it in a slightly different context: “War is different.” (p. 3).
One difference, of course, may concern whether the President’s use of
military force in a given context is legal. If the President’s power to deploy the
American military in a certain fashion depends upon the existence of a state of
war, and if the President does not have the unilateral power to create or
ascertain that state, then the President is legally constrained in his or her ability
to use military force, even if the President believes such use of force to be wise
policy. Much of Professor Griffin’s book traces the history of such
deployments. He does not purport to resolve the relevant legal issues in any
definitive fashion—that would require, at a minimum, articulation of an
interpretative theory within which to resolve them—so it is not my place here
to critique his brief discussion. My only point here is that Professor Griffin
does not really define what he means by “war,” and I am not sure that he can
get away without such a definition.
The meaning of the “declare War” clause has long been hotly contested,
both within and without originalist circles. One theory, associated most closely
with John Yoo, suggests that the power to “declare” war means only a power
to bring into play certain international and domestic norms of conduct; it does
not mean the power to control the use of force, which is vested in the President
by virtue of the “executive Power.”36 Professor Griffin roundly rejects this
position.37 While I think that Professor Yoo’s (and Professor Delahunty’s)
States to govern occupied territory stems, not from the grants to Congress of power to
govern territory that belongs to the United States, but from the provision in Article II
granting the President the “executive Power,” which includes the power to wage war in
accordance with international norms.”).
33 That, of course, has not prevented presidents from advancing, and courts from
endorsing, wildly implausible understandings of “executive Power” in this context when felt
needs seemed to call for it. See id. at 166-87 (providing a breakdown of the events
surrounding war tariff collection by the military government in California that led to Cross
v. Harrison).
34 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
35 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
36 See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 10; John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by
Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996)
(examining the historical and legal background of the war powers in the Anglo-American
world of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
37 See GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 41-45 (arguing that John Yoo’s position was “created by
presidentialists after 1950 in order to help justify the change in the constitutional order
required by the new circumstances of the Cold War” and “had no prior role in the American
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theory has more to commend it than is often recognized,38 let us go with
Professor Griffin and say that the power to “declare War” vests in Congress,
and only in Congress, the power to bring the United States into a state of war.
What does that mean retrospectively for past presidential actions and
prospectively for future ones?
If “war” means every aggressive use of the American military,39 so that the
exclusive congressional power to “declare War” means the power to determine
the timing, terms, and conditions of those uses, then virtually every President
has committed impeachable offenses,40 because virtually every President has
made some aggressive use of the American military without even an informal
congressional declaration of war. On the other hand, if the “declare War”
clause only requires congressional authorization to create a state of war but not
to respond to a state of war that already exists,41 then the inquiry about
presidential action shifts to whether a state of war actually existed in any
particular instance and whether presidential action was an appropriate response
to that state of war. And of course both inquiries could be pertinent: one could
believe, in addition to the “response” theory, that some aggressive uses of
force are not “war” and are therefore committed to the President through the
“executive Power,” that some aggressive uses of force are neither “war” nor
committed to the President and are therefore constitutionally forbidden to any
federal actor, or that all aggressive uses of force are “war” and therefore
require congressional authorization.

constitutional tradition”).
38 I am not convinced that anyone has successfully answered the intricate textual and
intra-textual argument that lies at the heart of the Yoo-Delahunty position. See Delahunty &
Yoo, supra note 10, at 139-58. Argument has tended to center around history and practice,
both of which are potentially useful aids to textual interpretation but both of which are
decidedly the handmaidens of textual analysis rather than vice versa. To be sure, I am not at
all certain that the “executive Power” vested by Article II includes the power to initiate a
war of aggression, so I am not at all certain that Professors Yoo and Delahunty are right in
their ultimate conclusion, but the question is, I think, closer than many are willing to credit.
39 It seems to be common ground among everyone that the President can authorize purely
defensive actions without congressional approval. It is not at all clear to me how at least
some of the various theories of the war powers derive that position, but let us leave that for
another day. I use the term “aggressive” to describe uses of the military that do not respond
to immediate attacks.
40 Professor Griffin appends an exclamation point to the claim “that presidents should be
impeached (!) when they fail to get congressional authorization for any military
intervention, regardless of the circumstances.” GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 240. But if the
underlying substantive view is correct, so that “war” means any use of the American
military, then impeachment seems like an eminently appropriate remedy to rein in a rogue
President. Impeachment is only an outlandish idea if the underlying substantive view is
mistaken.
41 That is essentially the position of Mike Ramsey. See Ramsey, supra note 10.
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Professor Griffin makes it very clear that his discussion does not encompass
all possible uses of force,42 which implicitly means that he does not treat all
uses of force as “war” for constitutional purposes. For instance, he describes as
“consistent” (p. 201) with his approach the Office of Legal Counsel’s
determination that American military intervention in Haiti to overthrow a
military government “was not a ‘war’ within the meaning of the Declaration of
War Clause.”43 While that intervention was invited by a government that the
United States recognized as legitimate, the OLC opinion did not rest on that
fact alone but considered “the nature, scope, and duration of the
deployment.”44 Specifically, it said, “we believe that ‘war’ does not exist
where United States troops are deployed at the invitation of a fully legitimate
government in circumstances in which the nature, scope, and duration of the
deployment are such that the use of force involved does not rise to the level of
‘war.’”45 Professor Griffin takes a similar tack, albeit without the lever of an
invitation from a recognized government, when he says of the 2011 American
military intervention in Libya that “there was nothing about the Libya
operation that made it close to a war or even remotely likely that it would
become one.” (pp. 250-51).
I am unclear why having lots of bombs dropping on people from American
military aircraft is not “close to a war.” Maybe it isn’t a war, or even close, but
one needs a worked-out theory of what constitutes a constitutional “war” in
order to make that judgment. The OLC Haiti opinion, with its “this is not a war
because we say that it isn’t a war” flavor, shows the difficulty of that task.46 I
can well understand why Professor Griffin wants to avoid it, and because his
focus is on describing events in major conflicts that are wars by any plausible
understanding, I suppose that he can get away with it. But in a book about war,
it would be helpful to know how we are supposed to recognize a war when we
see one. If Professor Griffin means to endorse something like the OLC
position, then I cannot really say that I do not think that “war” means what he
thinks it means, because I will be unable to ascertain what he thinks it means.
To the extent that there are any distinctively constitutional implications to
Professor Griffin’s study, we need to know what he thinks it means.

42

“Many people believe, for example, that important questions are at stake every single
time the president orders the use of any sort of military force. By contrast, I closely analyze
presidential decisionmaking concerning major wars . . . .” GRIFFIN, supra note 7, at 6. See
also id. at 30 (“[D]ebate should be centrally concerned with the ability of the executive
branch to initiate war, ‘real’ wars, major wars, rather than under what circumstances it can
use military force . . . .”); id. at 31 (“[T]he issue at hand is not presidential use of any sort of
military force. The issue is war.”).
43 Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 Op. O.L.C. 173, 177 (1994).
44 Id. at 178.
45 Id. at 179.
46 For a nice summary of some of the many thorny issues surrounding the definition of
“war,” see ZEISBERG, supra note 6, at 19-20.

